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Abstract
From the early 1990s, India embarked on easing capital controls. Liberalization
emphasised openness towards equity 
ows, both FDI and portfolio 
ows. In partic-
ular, there are few barriers in the face of portfolio equity 
ows. In recent years, a
massive increase in the value of foreign ownership of Indian equities has come about,
largely re
ecting improvements in the size, liquidity and corporate governance of
Indian rms. While the system of capital controls appears formidable, the de facto
openness on the ground is greater than is apparent, particularly because of the sub-
stantial enlargement of the current account. These changes to capital account open-
ness were not accompanied by commensurate monetary policy reform. The monetary
policy regime has consisted essentially of a pegged exchange rate to the US dollar
throughout. Increasing openness on the capital account, coupled with exchange rate
pegging, has led to a substantial loss of monetary policy autonomy. The logical way
forward now consists of bringing the de jure capital controls uptodate with the de
facto convertibility, and embarking on reforms of the monetary policy framework so
as to shift the focus of monetary policy away from the exchange rate to domestic
in
ation.
JEL Classication: F21, F34, E42
This paper is part of an ADB Institute research project Managing Capital Flows: Search for a Frame-
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21 Types and Magnitude of Capital Flows
1.1 The Indian Approach to Capital Controls
In the early 1990s India faced a balance of payments crisis. This crisis was followed by
an IMF structural adjustment program, economic reforms and liberalization of the trade
and capital accounts. Policy makers were, however, very cautious about opening up the
economy to debt 
ows. The experience of the Balance of Payments (BOP) crises as well
as the lessons learned from other developing countries suggested that debt 
ows, especially
short term debt 
ows, could lead to BOP diculties if the country faced macroeconomic
imbalances and had an in
exible exchange rate. The emphasis was, therefore, on foreign
investment | both foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio investment. Even these
were opened up slowly and a system of capital controls remained in place. For a detailed
treatment of the easing of capital controls in the 1990s, see Shah and Patnaik (2007a).
1.1.1 Inbound FDI
India opened up slowly to FDI in the 1990s. The limits on the share of foreign ownership
was slowly increased in every sector. By 2000, while most sectors were open up to 100 per-
cent, sectors where FDI was restricted include retail trading (except single brand product
retailing), atomic energy, and betting. Table 1 shows the areas where FDI caps exist.
While inbound FDI investors have the ability to repatriate capital, so far, in the Indian
experience, this reverse 
ow of capital has been tiny. As an example, in 2006{07, it was
0.01% of GDP. Hence, for all practical purposes, inbound FDI has been a one-way process
of capital coming into the country.1
The easing of capital controls, coupled with strong investment opportunities in India, gave
a strong rise in FDI 
ows into India: from 0.14% of GDP in 1992{93 to 0.53% in 1999{
2000 and then to 2.34% of GDP in 2006{07. Figure 1 shows quarterly data, which suggests
particularly strong growth in the recent period.
From April 2000 to August 2007, $44 billion came into India through FDI. In terms of the
country composition, the bulk of FDI into India came from Mauritius; the reason for this
is that India has a preferential tax treaty with Mauritius.
Services, nancial and non-nancial, attracted the highest amount of FDI. Between April
2000 and August 2007, US$8 billion, or 20.6of all FDI 
ows, came into the services sector.
1There are four kinds of gross 
ows in the case of FDI. There are inbound 
ows, and repatriated
capital, for FDI in India by foreigners. There are outbound 
ows, and then repatriated capital in the
reverse direction, for outbound FDI from India. Some BOP statements for India show net FDI in
ows
into India as a single net number summing up these four components. In this paper, we are careful to
separate out the net capital 
ows associated with two distinct phenomena: FDI in India and FDI by India.
The latter is discussed in Section 1.1.5 as one of the mechanisms for outward capital 
ows.
3Table 1 Sectoral FDI Limits
Sector Limit (percent)
Areas where restrictions exist
Airlines 49
Atomic minerals 74
Asset Reconstruction Companies 49
Banking 74
Broadcasting 20 / 26/ 49/100
Defense 26
Insurance 26




Single brand retailing 51
Satellite comm. 74
All other sectors 100
Source: Foreign Direct Investment Policy, April 2006, Department
of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce & In-
dustry.
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Next was computer software and hardware which attracted 16(8.7%), automobile industry
(8.7%), construction (5.2%) and power (3.4%) came next.
1.1.2 Portfolio Flows
In the early 1990s, India opened up to portfolio in
ows through \foreign institutional
investors" (FIIs). This policy framework was largely in place by 2000. Equity investment
by foreign institutional investors involves the following constraints:
 The aggregate foreign holding in a company is subject to a limit that can be set by
the shareholders of the company. This limit is, in turn, subject to \sectoral limits"
which apply in certain sectors.
 No one foreign portfolio investor can own more than 10% of a company. Foreign
ownership in certain sectors (telecom, insurance, banking) is capped at various levels.
Barring these constraints, portfolio investors have convertibility in the sense that they are
free to bring capital in and out of the country without requiring permissions. Unlike the
Chinese QFI framework, there are no quantitative restrictions or limitations on participa-
tion by global nancial rms in the Indian market. More than a thousand global rms are
now registered in India as \FIIs."
In parallel, over the 1992{2001 period, a substantial policy eort took place in reforming
the equity market (Thomas, 2006). As an example, Figure 2 shows the number of listed
rms where trading takes place on at least two-thirds of the days of the year. By November
2007, the market value of this set of rms stood at $1.6 trillion: this value marks a sea
change when compared with the level of $0.11 trillion found in November 1997. In recent
years, the two Indian exchanges (NSE and BSE) have been ranked third and fth in the
world by number of transactions.
6Figure 3 Inbound Portfolio Flows




























In many emerging markets, issuance on the ADR/GDR markets has been an important ve-
hicle for nancial globalization. In the case of India, the ADR/GDR market was signicant
in 1994{97 because in 1993, when FII investment into India rst surged, the settlement
system collapsed. Issuance on the ADR/GDR markets was seen as a way to avoid the
weak institutions of the domestic stock market. However, by 1997 domestic equity market
reforms had made substantial progress.
We express the 
ow of issuance on the GDR/ADR markets as a fraction of the stock
market capitalization at the end of the year. This series showed large values averaging
1.08% over the period from 1993 to 1997. By 1997, the Indian equity market reforms had
started falling into place. As a consequence, annual issuance on the GDR/ADR market
dropped to 0.4% of market capitalization in the period from 1998 to 2007. In this respect,
India's experience has been dierent from that of many emerging markets, where deepening
nancial globalization has often been accompanied by a substantial scale of oshore listing.
The combination of easing capital controls, strong investment opportunities in India, and
the sophistication of the domestic equity market led to sharp growth in portfolio in
ows.
These went from 0.11% of GDP in 1992{93 to 0.73% of GDP in 1999{00 and further to
0.84% of GDP in 2006{07.
Figure 3 shows the time-series of portfolio 
ows, expressed as percent to GDP. Unlike
FDI, a remarkable feature of portfolio 
ows has been substantial inbound and outbound

ows, which leave a small net in
ow. This re
ects the de facto convertibility that has been
granted to foreign portfolio investors on the equity market.
In 2007, the government introduced fresh capital controls against \participatory notes,"
which are OTC derivatives sold by a nancial rm which is a registered FII to an investor
who is not registered. This was sought to be done in order to reduce capital in
ows into
the country that were inducing diculties for the implementation of the pegged exchange
rate. However, the economic impact of this was limited, since the capital control was only
against the sale of OTC derivatives. Registration of FIIs took place at an accelerated pace,
7and there was no signicant change in either net portfolio purchases by FIIs, or the role of
FIIs in the domestic market.2
1.1.3 Sovereign Debt
One element of the policy framework of the early 1990s was encouragement for equity 
ows
but barriers against debt in
ows. Technically, the government of India has no sovereign
debt program. Aid 
ows are miniscule. There is a cap on the stock of ownership of
government bonds by FIIs which is set at a miniscule number of $1.5 billion. Hence, as a
practical matter, FII investment into rupee-denominated government bonds is zero.
However, from time to time, banks have borrowed abroad depending on the government's
assessment of the stock of foreign exchange reserves and their adequacy. One form this has
taken is borrowing in the form of bank deposits of Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) (Gordon
and Gupta, 2004). The interest rates on these deposits are set by the RBI and 
uctuate
according to whether the government wishes to encourage or discourage in
ows. Three-
quarters of Indian bank deposits are with government-owned banks, which are explicitly
guaranteed by the government. Even with private banks, there is an implicit liability of
the State, for no signicant private bank has ever been allowed to fail. The borrowing of
an Indian bank is, then, visibly backed by the government.
The authorities claim that a massive reduction in oshore debt, particularly oshore
sovereign debt, took place in the 1990s. By the ocial classication, the external debt
of GOI stagnated at between $45 billion and $50 billion over 1998{2007. However, a
more accurate rendition of the situation requires addressing a phenomenon that we term
\quasi-sovereign" debt.
Table 4 shows statistics for quasi-sovereign borrowing, based on a reclassication of the
detailed statistics for debt stock. While sovereign debt measured in dollars has stagnated,
implying a rapid decline in sovereign debt expressed as percent to GDP (from 20% in 1992
to 6% in 2007), this decline is exaggerated by keeping quasi-sovereign debt out of this
reckoning.
Until 2000, the private sector had roughly one-fourth of total debt. Between 2000 and
2007, the share of the private sector rose to roughly 40%, re
ecting the liberalization of
ECB. However, the economic signicance of these changes is limited, for private debt to
GDP in 2007 was below the level seen in 1992.
2For a discussion about participatory notes, see Singh (2007). For a treatment of this episode
of capital controls against participatory notes, see http://ajayshahblog.blogspot.com/2007/10/
middle-muddle.html on the world wide web.
8Table 4 The Importance of Quasi-sovereign Borrowing
1992 2000 2007
Stock of debt (Billion US$)
Sovereign debt 48.62 45.98 47.24
Quasi-sovereign debt 15.96 25.63 45.26
Private debt 20.71 26.65 62.54
Total debt 85.29 98.26 155.04
Ratios (in percent)
Sovereign debt to GDP 20.20 11.30 6.08
Sovereign + quasi sovereign debt to GDP 26.83 17.59 11.90
Private debt to GDP 8.60 6.55 8.05
Private debt to total debt 24.28 27.12 40.34
Figure 4 External Commercial Borrowing


























1.1.4 Debt of Firms
Firms are allowed to borrow abroad through \External commercial Borrowing." These
include loans or bond issues abroad that are foreign currency denominated. Small transac-
tions are processed by the government with \automatic approval," and bigger transactions
require permission. Under the present policy framework:
 External borrowing by rms must be of at least 3 years' maturity for borrowing below
$20 million, and at least 5 years' maturity beyond.
 Borrowing up to $500 million by a rm for certain specied end-uses is allowed
without requiring permissions.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of ECB, expressed as percent of GDP. The borrowing of a
given year inevitably induces repayment in the following years; the net in
ows on account
of ECB re
ects the combination of fresh issuance of the year and repayments owing to
older transactions.


























Apart from ECB, foreign institutional investors can buy rupee-denominated corporate debt
on the domestic market. However, there is a miniscule cap on ownership of corporate bonds
by all FIIs put together at $2.5 billion. Hence, as a practical matter, FII investment into




ows primarily take two forms. The rst and massive mechanism is the
purchase of US treasury bills and other foreign assets by RBI when it builds reserves. This
has seen a sharp increase in recent years as seen in Figure 5.
The other form of capital out
ows that has become important in recent years is outbound
FDI by Indian companies. Outbound FDI 
ows from India have risen sharply since 2004.
India's overseas investment policy was liberalized in 1992. The rationale for opening up
Indian investment overseas was to provide Indian industry access to new markets and tech-
nologies with a view to increasing their competitiveness. The policy was further liberalized
in 1995. Since 2004 Indian companies have been allowed to invest in entities abroad up to
200% of their net worth in a year.
In response, thousands of Indian rms have embarked on turning themselves into multi-
national corporations. Overseas investment approvals have been steadily increasing since
1996. Approvals for investment abroad were at 1395 ($2,855 million) in 2005{06 as com-
pared to 290 approvals ($557 million) in 1996{97. But the sharpest growth took place
in 2006|07. In 2006{07, between April and October, 870 approvals were granted to In-
dian companies for overseas investments worth $6,034.87 million as compared with 822
approvals worth $1,191 million in the corresponding period of last year, a sharp jump of
more than 5 times.
Figure 6 juxtaposes inbound and outbound (net) FDI 
ows, both expressed as percent to
GDP. Outbound 
ows have risen sharply, to a level of over 1% of GDP a year. In 2006
10Figure 6 Inbound and outbound FDI

































Table 5 Sectoral Composition of Outbound FDI (April 1999 to October 2006)
Sector Outbound FDI (Billion US$) Share
Manufacturing 11.1 53.4
Financial services 0.2 1.4




ow of outbound FDI as a percentage of gross xed capital formation in India rose to
5gross outbound FDI rose to 1.5
Software rms were among the rst Indian rms that used overseas acquisitions as a way
to better access the US market. Pharmaceutical rms were next, and they employed
acquisitions to reach out to regulated overseas markets like Europe and the US. The share
of the primary sector in overseas investment is still low; it consists of natural resource
seeking companies such as ONGC, HPCL, BPCL and GAIL that have sought to get control
over oil resources in several countries like Russia, Iran, Sudan, Angola, etc. Mining of coal
and metals has also attracted investment by Indian companies. Three fourths of outbound
investment from India between 2000 and 2007 went to developed countries, mainly the US
and Europe.
A third front on which capital controls have been eased in recent years has been on out-
bound portfolio 
ows. There has been some response to these as various funds are now
oering international diversication to the Indian customer. In addition, individuals are
now permitted to take $200,000 per person per year out of the country. However, so far,
the magnitudes seen have been negligible.
111.2 De Jure Capital Controls in an International Context
India has retained strict control over the capital in
ows that are pemitted into the country.
In the last 10 years these controls have mainly been eased, but there have been instances
when they has also been tightened as in 2007 when the pressure on the currency increased.
Menzie Chinn and Hiro Ito have developed a measure of capital account openness (Chinn
and Ito, 2006). This "Chinn-Ito measure" is an index of capital controls available for many
countries, for many years. It is based on processing responses of countries to the IMF (the
AREARs). In response to each question, the country scores 1 for saying \yes" and 0 for
supplying a long paragraph which indicates that there are controls. The Chinn-Ito measure
shows the state of de jure convertibility. Their measure is a stringent one, where a need
to obtain permission constitutes a restriction, even if the permission is "usually" or even
"always" given. Their focus is on measuring the extent to which governments are trying
to be involved in the capital account. Countries with a score of 2.6 have complete unques-
tioned capital account convertibility, where governments absolutely do not get involved in
any private decisions about movement of capital.
Figure 7 shows some summary statistics from the Chinn-Ito database. India's score has
been stable at -1.1 all through the period under examination.3 The top left graph shows
the opening up of emerging markets (the red dotted line) juxtaposed against the world
mean. The top right graph shows that members of the "Group of 20" have had a greater
level and pace of opening the capital account when compared with the world mean. The
bottom left graph computes the fraction of countries that are as closed as India, or worse.
It suggests that in roughly 1980, India's closed capital account was roughly the median
among countries in the world; by the end of this period, roughly 60% of countries were
more open than India. Finally, the right hand bottom graph shows the experience of a
few countries which undertook substantial reforms of capital controls: these trajectories
are quite unlike those seen for India.
Comparisons for India are most interesting against large countries. Hence, we focus on
the biggest 25 countries of the world by nominal GDP, the smallest of which is Austria.
Among these countries, the Chinn-Ito measure takes values from -1.1 to 2.6. There are
three countries at the bottom of the table | the last holdouts of nonconvertibility |
with a score of -1.1: Turkey, India and People's Republic of China. Amongst these top-25
countries, the average score is 1.467 and half of them are above 2.33. Key peers to India
are ahead in opening the capital account: Brazil is at 0.21, Russia is at -0.06, Mexico is at
1.23, Indonesia is at 1.23. When we go beyond these 25 countries to the full database of
180 countries, the median score is 0.18: much better than India's -1.1.
3The database released by Chinn and Ito shows a spike where India's score rose in 2000 and then
dropped back to -1.1. This appears to be related to some diculties in the data. A careful examination
of India's experience with capital controls in 2000 suggests no important change took place in that year
that was reversed in the next year.
12Figure 7 India's De Jure Opening, in the Context of the Chinn Ito Measure








































































































































13Table 6 Structure of net capital 
ows
Debt Equity Other Total
1993 2.99 0.25  0.97 2.27
2000 0.89 1.24 0.35 2.47
2007 2.98 1.87 0.55 5.40
Figure 8 Integration into the World Economy, Measured Through Gross Flows






























1.3 Evolution of Openness
Table 6 summarizes the structure of net capital 
ows into India, expressed as percent of
GDP.
Net capital 
ows stagnated at roughly 2.5% of GDP from 1993 to 2000, and have since
risen sharply to 5.4% of GDP by 2007. This has partly re
ected a rise in equity 
ows,
which were encouraged by policy makers, and went from 0.25% of GDP in 1993 to 1.24%
of GDP in 2000 to 1.87% of GDP in 2007.
India's policy makers have believed that debt 
ows are dangerous, and at rst, debt in
ows
dropped from 3% of GDP in 1993 to 0.9% of GDP in 2000. However, by 2007, debt in
ows
were back to 2.98% of GDP.
Table 7 and Figure 8 focus on gross 
ows as a metric of integration with the world economy.
The familiar trade/GDP ratio sums up merchandise imports and exports, and expresses
them as percent of GDP: it is used as a measure of merchandise trade integration. We sum
up gross 
ows on the current and capital accounts, and express them as percent to GDP.
This gives us three measures of integration.
All these measures show a massive increase in international integration. Gross 
ows on the
current account rose from 25.88% in 1993 to 34.07% in 2000 and rose sharply to 60.63% in
2007. Gross 
ows on the capital account stagnated at roughly 18% from 1993 to 2000, but
then rose sharply to 49.38% in 2007. Putting these together, the overall integration metric
14Table 7 Metrics of integration
Current Capital Total
1993 25.88 18.35 44.23
2000 34.07 17.21 51.28
2007 60.63 49.38 110.01
went from roughly 50% of GDP over the 1993{2000 period to roughly 110% of GDP in
2007, suggesting a rapid pace of globalization in the post-2000 period.
This change, of sixty percentage points of GDP in the post-2000 period, was an unprece-
dented one. For a comparison, total 
ows stagnated at roughly 20% of GDP between
1956{57 and 1986{87. The reforms of the early 1990s led to a much bigger value of 49.9%
in 1996{97. This was followed by a dramatic expansion to 110% of GDP in 2006{07. This
suggests a rapid and unprecedented globalization of the Indian economy (Kelkar, 2004).
1.4 De Facto Openness Exceeds De Jure Openness
A careful look at the system of capital controls reveals many aspects of openness that are
not immediately apparent.
One element of this openness lies in remittances. A survey of banks found that roughly half
of remittance 
ows were used for acquiring nancial assets. In recent years, the correlation
coecient between the rupee{dollar interest rate dierential, and remittance in
ows, prove
to be as high as 0.8. This emphasizes the extent to which capital account considerations
shape what is apparently a current account transaction.
In terms of absolute magnitude, remittance 
ows have been roughly as big as net capital
in
ows. This suggests that if the capital in
ows component of remittances were correctly
measured, net capital in
ows might need to be revised upwards by roughly 50%.
The other major source of openness is the current account. Indian and global rms with
operations in India are able to move capital across the boundary through misinvoicing. A
rm that is prevented from obtaining oshore debt by the system of capital controls could
contract debt overseas under the name of an oshore subsidiary, and transfer-price this
capital into India. Similar processes could be used for repayment. Given that gross 
ows
on the current account are over 60% of GDP, if misinvoicing of 10% on average takes place
in a single direction, this could add roughly 6% to net capital 
ows.
15Table 8 Change in Home Bias Against India
March 2001 March 2007
ICAPM weight of India 0.42 1.53
Actual weight of India 0.04 0.24
Home bias metrics
1 - (actual/ICAPM) 0.92 0.85
ICAPM /actual 11.8 6.47
Source: Shah and Patnaik (2007b)
2 Determinants of Portfolio Flows
The most interesting element of capital 
ows into India that merits exploration is portfolio

ows. The reason for this is two-fold. First, this was the rst element where liberalization
in the form of convertibility for foreign institutional investors came in, and ample data is
available from a mature policy regime. Second, as Figure 3 suggests, the capital 
owing
in and out of the country on account of portfolio 
ows is large; this is the biggest single
component of gross 
ows on the capital account.
2.1 The Evolution of Home Bias against India
Table 8 shows that over the 2001{2007 period, home bias against India declined. The
ICAPM weight for India went from being 11.8 times bigger than the actual in March 2001
to being 6.47 times bigger in March 2007. The market value of shares held by portfolio
investors went up by 12.8 times over this six-year period: from $9.67 billion to $124.2
billion or over 10% of GDP. These stylized facts demand exploration.
2.2 Time-series Evidence
Monthly data on net portfolio in
ows from foreign institutional investors is available in
India from 1996 onwards.4 A key diculty in dealing with this data lies in nding an
appropriate parametrization, for portfolio 
ows measured in million dollars per month
were small in 1996 and have become large in 2007. In order to stabilize the distribution,
we focus on the net portfolio in
ow of each month expressed as percent of the broad
market capitalization of that month.5 At the end of 2007, broad market capitalization
4There are two time-series which are available, the above mentioned series from RBI, and a shorter
series from SEBI. The correlation coecient between the two series is 0.866. The results in the text are
based on the longer RBI time-series. These results are qualitatively similar to those obtained with the
shorter data from SEBI, and are available from the authors on request.
5The CMIE Cospi index is used as the broad market index.
16Table 9 Explaining Monthly Net FII Flows
Parameter Value t statistic
Intercept 0.2837 4.26
CIP Deviation 0.0235 3.57
CIP Deviation squared 0.0017 3.58
Lagged monthly returns on Nifty:
1 month 0.0075 3.80
2 months 0.0038 1.86
3 months 0.0047 2.36
4 months 0.0030 1.55
CMIE Cospi P/E -0.0061 -1.86
VIX -0.0032 -1.48
was $1.6 trillion. Hence, in this parametrization, a one percentage point of broad market
capitalization corresponds to a net in
ow in one month of $16 billion.
In previous work (Shah and Patnaik, 2007a), currency expectations | measured by the
Covered Interest Parity deviation | have been found to be useful in explaining portfolio

ows. However, the CIP deviation takes on some extreme values and there is a danger of
regression results being distorted as a consequence.6 Hence, robust regressions are utilized.7
Table 9 shows a model that explains net FII in
ows (expressed as percent of broad market
capitalization).8 The key features of this model are:
 Currency expectations, measured by the CIP deviation, matter strongly. If the CIP
deviation shifts from 0 to 5, this induces additional portfolio in
ows of 0.03% of the
broad market capitalization. This indicates that expectations of currency apprecia-
tion attract portfolio 
ows into India. At the end of 2007, this corresponded to $0.5
billion in one month.
 Nifty is the main stock market index of India. Lagged Nifty returns matter with
lags of 1 through 4 months. Contemporaneous nifty returns are not utilized in this
regression given the potential impact of portfolio in
ows on the stock market index.
Since monthly Nifty returns are roughly random, it is possible to get an estimate of
the total impact of a 1% shock to Nifty in a month, over the coming four months, by
summing up the coecients. This yields a rough estimate of 0.019. In other words,
if Nifty returns prove to be 10% in a month, this induces additional in
ows of 0.19%
of the market capitalization spread over the coming four months. At the end of 2007,
0.19% of market capitalization works out to $3 billion.
6Section 13.5.2 of Shah and Patnaik (2007a) explains the unique interpretation of the deviation from
CIP in India as a measure of currency expectations. Figure 13.3 and 13.4 there suggest that there may be
diculties with in
uential observations when using CIP deviation in a regression.
7We use robust regression using an M estimator, as implemented by Venables and Ripley (2002).
8This model is an improved version of Table 13.13 of Shah and Patnaik (2007a), which pertains to a
shorter time-series.
17 Foreign investors are deterred by a high value of the broad market P/E, and vice
versa. When the market P/E is high, foreign investors expect it to go down and
therefore 
ows fall.
 Finally, high levels of the VIX deter portfolio 
ows into India. The VIX measures the
market's view about future volatility re
ecting what the market thinks the volatility
of the S&P 500 index, the stock market index for the biggest 500 US companies, will
be over the next one month.9 A low level of VIX implies that returns from the global
market will lie within a narrow band. When the VIX goes up, it suggests that returns
on stock prices are likely to be in a much higher band, in other words, much more
volatile. When the market is complacent about the future it suggests that people feel
that it is unlikely that returns from investment will be low. This encourages them
to invest more in risky assets. And when the VIX goes up, people are less willing to
take risks. A higher level of the VIX therefore results in lower portfolio 
ows into an
emerging economy like India.
Table 9 shows results of a robust regression. The results are not unlike those found using
an ordinary OLS.10
Variables which might have been expected to have an impact on portfolio 
ows into India
but are not statistically signicant in this regression include: the Indian short rate, the
US short rates and the spreads between the two, industrial production growth, S&P 500
returns, the US long rate, the US Baa corporate bond rate, Nifty volatility, INR/US$
currency volatility, the US term spread and the US credit spread.
2.3 Explaining the Decline in Home Bias
Recent literature has examined the characteristics of rms in emerging markets which are
able to internationalize their shareholding (Claessens and Schmukler, 2006). Shah and
Patnaik (2007b) obtain insights through the following decomposition of F, the value of
foreign ownership of shares in an emerging market. Let F = g(1   p)M, where M is the
market capitalization of the country; p is the insider shareholding and g is the fraction of
outsider shareholding that is held by foreigners.11 Total dierentiation yields:
F  M(1   p)g + g(1   p)M   gMp
The rst term, M(1 p)g, can be interpreted as the change in F associated with a change
in g holding other things constant. This corresponds to traditional home bias explanations.
9Options on the S&P 500 are traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). The option
prices seen on the market imply a value for the future volatility that traders must have on their mind
when trading the options. This value is reverse engineered out of the observed option prices, thus giving
the VIX in real time.
10Details are available from the authors on request.
11Stulz (2005) has emphasized that insider ownership limits the extent to which home bias can go down.
18The second term, g(1   p)M, measures the rise in foreign ownership owing to a higher
M, holding other sources of home bias unchanged. It re
ects foreign investors preserving
their ownership of g(1   p) on a larger M, re
ecting icapm-style reasoning while ignoring
changes in world market capitalization. The third term,  gMp, may be termed a \Stulz
eect," re
ecting the drop in foreign ownership associated with a rise in insider ownership
p, while holding other things constant.
This decomposition is not an economic model explaining the dynamics of F. Rather, it
represents an attempt at accounting for the changes in F and obtaining a quantitative
sense of the importance of the three forces at work. Shah and Patnaik (2007b) show these
calculations with Indian data. As an example, in 2005, F went up by Rs.622 billion. This
change breaks down to three elements: Rs.317 billion owing to traditional explanations of
home bias, Rs.501 billion owing to bigger Indian market capitalization and a decline of
Rs.182 billion since insider increased their ownership share in 2005.
This focuses interest on understanding g, the fraction of outside shareholding that is held by
foreigners, estimated using rm-level data. Modelling this requires a two-stage \Heckman-
style" model, because there is a large clump of rms with zero foreign ownership. This
implies a distinction between selectivity and propensity eects.
The key nding of Shah and Patnaik (2007b) concerns the importance of year characteris-
tics after controlling for rm characteristics. After controlling for rm characteristics, year
xed eects on the OLS equation exhibit little year-to-year 
uctuation.
This suggests that the recent surge of foreign investment into India was largely induced by
modied rm characteristics, and not a change in sentiment about India as a whole. The
growth of the economy, economic reforms and particularly the successful reforms of the
equity market have given a transformed situation in terms of rm characteristics. With
these modied characteristics in place by 2007, rms were much more attractive to global
investors than was the case in 2001.
3 Macroeconomic Impact of Capital Flows
In India, the monetary policy framework is lightly specied. The RBI Act does not clearly
specify the goals of monetary policy. Institutional mechanisms for independence, trans-
parency and accountability are not specied. RBI has generally emphasized a \multiple
objectives" framework, where the goals of monetary policy are not specied, and the market
does not know a monetary policy rule.
The goals of monetary policy change from time to time but are not eectively commu-
nicated to the market. Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) score the transparency of central
banks. On a scale of 0 to 15, Asian central banks have been improving as a whole, scoring
5.1 in 2005, compared to 3 in 1998. The People's Republic of China's transparency im-
19proved to 4.5 from 1. RBI has stagnated at a score of 2 all through. RBI in 2005 lagged
behind the Asian average of 1998.12
This approach towards monetary policy has come under stress in the context of a pegged
exchange rate and increasing de facto openness. In this section, we examine the macroeco-
nomic impact of capital 
ows. Our treatment runs from the pegged exchange rate regime,
to currency intervention by RBI, to the extent to which sterilization is achieved, the loss
of monetary policy autonomy and its impact on in
ation.
3.1 The Backdrop | a Pegged Exchange Rate
According to RBI, the rupee is a \market determined exchange rate," in the sense that
there is a currency market and the exchange rate is not administratively determined. India
has clearly moved away from xed exchange rates. However, RBI actively trades on the
market with the goal of \containing volatility" and in
uencing the market price.
In India, as in most developing countries, there has been a distinction between the de facto
and the de jure currency regime. In the case of India, Patnaik (2007) shows that that the
INR is de facto pegged to the US$. As is typical with such an exchange rate regime, the
nominal INR/US$ exchange rate has had low volatility, while other exchange rates with
respect to the rupee have been more volatile.
While the INR currency regime has been de facto pegged to the US$, the extent of pegging
has varied signicantly through this period. The exchange rate regression, popularized by
Frankel and Wei (1994), involves regressions of weekly percentage changes of the exchange
rate of the INR against the Swiss Franc (a numeraire) against weekly percentage changes
against the same numeraire for the US dollar, pounds sterling, the euro and the Japanese
yen. The residual volatility of this regression is a measure of exchange rate 
exibility. A
mechanism for identifying structural breaks in the exchange rate regime that is consonant
with this regression is required. Zeileis et al. (2007) have identied the following phases of
the Indian currency regime.
Period 1: April 2, 1993 to February 17, 1995 This was the period where trading in the
INR rst began. For most of this period, there was strong pressure to appreciate, which
was blocked by purchases of US$ by the central bank, giving a de facto xed exchange rate
at Rs.31.37 per dollar.
Period 2: February 18, 1995 to August 21, 1998 In this period, which included the period
of the Asian crisis, there was the highest-ever currency 
exibility in India's experience. Even
if the RBI made public statements about \managing volatility on the currency market,"
the credibility of these statements was low in the eyes of the market given the small size
12Poirson (2008) analyzes the diculties of transparency at RBI and oers proposals about how this
can be improved.






















2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
RBI fx purchases
of foreign exchange reserves. In January 1998, an interest rate defense was employed to
defend the INR: the short interest rate was raised by 200 bps.
Period 3: August 22, 1998 to March 19, 2004 This was a period of tight pegging, with low
volatility and some appreciation. A substantial reserves accumulation took place, which
led to considerable distortion of monetary policy.
Period 4: March 20, 2004 to January 31, 2008 In this period, there has been greater cur-
rency 
exibility when compared with Period 3. However, currency 
exibility was at lower
levels when compared with Period 2. With massive reserves and a hectic pace of reserves
accumulation, the risk of a large depreciation was absent.
The evolution of the currency regime re
ected compulsions rooted in monetary policy and
the evolution of capital controls (Patnaik, 2005). In turn, the diculties of implementing
the exchange rate regime have shaped tactical details of the evolution of capital controls.
Since the evolution of the exchange rate regime is of essence in understanding capital 
ows
and monetary policy, many graphs in this paper show a vertical yellow line at these dates
of structural change of the exchange rate regime.
The pegged exchange rate regime has required a massive scale of trading on the currency
market by the RBI. Figure 9 shows foreign currency purchases of RBI in the units of crore
rupees per month.13
Figure 10 shows the time-series of foreign exchange reserves. In the early and mid-1990s,
there was a motivation for building reserves in order to insure against adverse shocks. As
demonstrated in Patnaik (2003), by the late 1990s, reserves were more than adequate for
self-insurance, and currency purchases were primarily motivated by implementation of the
pegged exchange rate. Over the 2003{2008 period, reserves were between eight to nine
months of imports of goods and services, well in excess of what is considered safe. Total
131 crore is 10 million. At an exchange rate of Rs.40 per US$, one billion dollars is Rs.4,000 crore.
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short-term external debt was between 10% and 15% of reserves over this period, well below
what is considered dangerous.
This increase in Net Foreign Exchange Assets of the RBI would lead to a sharp increase
in the monetary base. To prevent this from happening, sterilization has been attempted.
3.2 Extent of Sterilization
Figure 11 juxtaposes currency trading against sterilization. When sterilization was eective
| as is the case from 2000 to 2004 | the two curves in the graph appear to be mirror
images.
The RBI ran out of government bonds for the purpose of sterilization in late 2003. From
January 2004 onwards, a new mechanism for sterilization | the Market Stabilization
Scheme (MSS) | was put in place. The MSS authorizes RBI to sell bonds on behalf of
the government, for the purpose of sterilization. The government would not utilize the
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proceeds obtained by the sale of these bonds, so as to ensure there was no impact on the
monetary system. There was an initial ceiling on the MSS at Rs.0.6 trillion, which has
since been raised to Rs.2.5 trillion.
A key strength of MSS lies in the fact that it makes the cost of sterilized intervention more
transparent. Interest payments for MSS have risen, and these expenses face scrutiny in the
budget process. This may have helped keep MSS bond issuance under check.
As Figure 11 shows, in Period 4, the two curves are generally not mirror images. This
underlines the limited sterilization which has taken place. Figure 9, coupled with Figure
11, shows that it was not possible to decouple RBI's currency trading from monetary
policy; the implementation of the pegged exchange rate has had implications for reserve
money.
3.3 Loss of Monetary Policy Autonomy
Figure 12 juxtaposes the currency purchases of RBI (left scale, in rupees crore) and year-
on-year reserve money growth (right scale, in percent). The incomplete sterilization that is
visible in Figure 11 in the post-2004 period has led to a pronounced acceleration of reserve
money growth.
One method through which high M0 growth can be confronted is to raise reserve require-
ments of banks. While reserve requirements have been raised in India in Period 4 | thus
reversing a decade-long eort at phasing out reserve requirements which were seen as a tax
on banking | they have not been able to prevent a signicant acceleration in M3 growth.
This is shown in Figure 13.
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3.4 Impact on In
ation
The 
ip side of the coin of this atmosphere of unsterilized intervention and high money
supply growth is low interest rates. As Figure 14 shows, real interest rates have been very
low. Real rates in India have been low when compared with other Asian countries. With
low real rates, the stance of monetary policy has been expansionary.
Figure 15 shows the experience with in
ation, in response to this environment of high
money supply growth and low real rates. While the Wholesale Price Index is widely
watched in India, the Consumer Price Index is a better measure of in
ation. It has risen
after 2004, and has remained stubbornly high when compared with the aspirations of
politicians and policymakers.
3.5 Summary: Pegged Exchange Rate Induced a Loss of Mone-
tary Policy Autonomy
As is well understood, the pursuit of a pegged exchange rate in the context of increasing
openness on the capital account is inevitably associated with the loss of monetary policy
autonomy. In the Indian case, the strategies which have been attempted for regaining
monetary policy autonomy include:
Augment mechanisms for sterilization MSS bonds were created, to augment the ca-
pability for sterilization.
Enhanced reserve requirements Reserve requirements on banks were increased, so as
to prevent accelerated M0 growth from spilling into higher M3 growth.
Capital controls RBI has advocated a signicant reversal of liberalization of the capi-
tal account. However, this reversion to capital controls would hurt the interests of
25many participants in the democratic decision making process. In addition, the au-
tarkic policy goals of RBI have been out of tune with the broad consensus in India
about moving forward towards becoming a mature market economy that is integrated
into the world economy. As a consequence, while some capital controls have been
attempted, they have not been harsh enough to solve the diculties described above.
Currency 
exibility Episodes of currency 
exibility have taken place when the imple-
mentation of the erstwhile exchange rate regime was dicult. The exchange rate
regime in Period 4 has greater currency 
exibility when compared with that in Pe-
riod 3.
These strategies have not been adequate. The RBI has repeatedly argued that the impos-
sible trinity is not a constraint: that it is possible to have both a pegged exchange rate
and monetary policy autonomy. However, despite the use of these four mechanisms, the
scale of currency trading required for implementing the pegged exchange rate regime has
impacted upon monetary policy to a substantial extent.
Monetary policy in India is now acted out on a day-to-day basis in RBI's currency trading
room. The pegged exchange rate regime, coupled with signicant openness in the capital
account, has induced a loss of monetary policy autonomy.
4 Appropriate Policy Responses
This paper has suggested that there is a substantial mismatch between the needs of India, a
fast-growing and fast-globalizing trillion dollar economy, and the present policy framework
of capital controls and monetary policy. The present policy framework, which served India
well in the 1980s and 1990s, is under increasing stress. There is a signicant possibility
of experiencing an external sector crisis owing to the inherent contradictions of this policy
framework. In addition, upholding this policy framework involves signicant costs.
The appropriate strategy for policy involves two key elements: monetary policy reform and
a rapid movement to convertibility.
4.1 Monetary Policy Reform
The most important weakness of the Indian policy environment is the monetary policy
framework. The present framework, which involves a lack of specication of goals of the
central bank, has come under tremendous stress owing to the combination of exchange rate
pegging and increasing de facto openness.
There is now a strong consensus internationally about how monetary policy should func-
tion. Sound monetary policy involves attributes such as independence, transparency, pre-
dictability, rules rather than discretion, anchoring of in
ationary expectations in the eyes
26of economic agents, and accountability. All these principles are violated in India. Mone-
tary policy reform is required in India in order to achieve these principles (Mistry, 2007;
Shah, 2008).
When monetary policy is structured in these ways, many important benets are harnessed.
Sound monetary policy stabilizes the business cycle, and is made eective by a properly
functioning monetary transmission. Sound monetary policy is \speculation proof" in that
the central bank completely controls the short-term interest rate but is not otherwise
involved in trading on nancial markets. A sound monetary policy framework stabilizes
capital 
ows, and (in turn) is not attenuated by 
uctuations of capital 
ows.
4.2 Full Convertibility
India is globalizing at a hectic rate. Gross 
ows in the current account and capital account
stand at 110% of GDP, and have grown by 60 percentage points in a decade. Under this
environment, capital controls have become increasingly ineective.
The central planning approach that is in use with capital 
ows, where the government
believes it knows what kinds of players and what kind of 
ows are best for the country, is
reminiscent of the central planning that India once employed in industrial policy. However,
a greater skepticism about this \industrial policy approach" to capital controls is called
for. The analytical foundations of such claims are weak or non-existent, and the ingenuity
of the private sector in dodging the system of capital controls is remarkable.
At this point in India's progression towards integration into the world economy, the rapid
dismantling of capital controls appears to be the best strategy. The rst elements where
full decontrol is immediately feasible are: FDI, portfolio 
ows and rupee-denominated
debt. In the case of FDI and portfolio 
ows, there is already convertibility, and all that
is needed to be done is the removal of procedures and frictions. Rupee denominated debt
does not involve \original sin" and should also feature in the early stages of opening up.
This opening up needs to be accompanied by a monetary policy reform, a shift towards
greater exchange rate 
exibility, and the creation of currency derivatives markets. Once
these are in place, liberalization of foreign currency debt and out
ows can take place.
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29A Statistical Appendix
30Table 10 Gross In
ows (billion US$)
Year Total Debt Banking FDI Portfolio Errors
1991 25 9 10 0 0 3
1992 25 9 11 0 0 3
1993 24 9 12 0 0 1
1994 29 10 12 1 4 3
1995 26 11 7 1 4 2
1996 24 11 6 2 3 1
1997 36 18 8 3 5 3
1998 39 17 9 4 6 4
1999 34 15 9 3 3 5
2000 41 13 11 2 10 5
2001 54 24 10 4 14 3
2002 43 12 14 6 9 2
2003 46 12 19 5 9 2
2004 76 20 19 4 28 4
2005 99 30 15 6 41 7
2006 144 39 22 9 68 6
2007 232 55 37 22 110 8
Table 11 Gross Out
ows (billion US$)
Year Total Debt Banking FDI Portfolio Errors
1991 16 4 9 0 0 1
1992 20 5 10 0 0 2
1993 19 8 8 0 0 1
1994 20 8 9 0 0 1
1995 19 8 7 0 1 0
1996 22 9 6 0 1 3
1997 25 13 6 0 2 3
1998 30 13 10 0 4 2
1999 26 10 8 0 3 3
2000 30 11 9 0 7 2
2001 45 19 12 1 11 3
2002 35 13 11 1 7 2
2003 36 15 9 2 8 1
2004 59 24 13 2 17 3
2005 71 19 11 2 32 6
2006 119 32 20 6 56 5
2007 186 30 35 14 103 4
31Table 12 Gross In
ows (Percent to GDP)
Year Total Debt Banking FDI Portfolio Errors
1991 8.47 3.25 3.48 0.04 0.00 1.07
1992 10.92 4.07 4.87 0.07 0.00 1.25
1993 10.15 3.63 5.02 0.14 0.10 0.57
1994 10.61 3.61 4.17 0.24 1.43 1.04
1995 8.02 3.38 2.17 0.42 1.36 0.68
1996 6.97 3.27 1.86 0.63 1.00 0.22
1997 9.42 4.61 2.09 0.75 1.29 0.68
1998 10.17 4.48 2.31 0.93 1.44 0.99
1999 8.29 3.58 2.16 0.61 0.78 1.12
2000 9.06 2.92 2.38 0.49 2.23 1.02
2001 12.06 5.31 2.17 0.90 3.03 0.64
2002 9.27 2.49 2.97 1.31 1.98 0.49
2003 8.98 2.24 3.67 0.99 1.71 0.36
2004 11.96 3.10 3.03 0.68 4.45 0.68
2005 13.65 4.19 2.02 0.84 5.66 0.93
2006 17.94 4.90 2.69 1.11 8.46 0.74
2007 24.14 5.69 3.87 2.30 11.39 0.80
Table 13 Gross Out
ows (Percent to GDP)
Year Total Debt Banking FDI Portfolio Errors
1991 5.63 1.34 3.24 0.00 0.00 0.41
1992 8.84 2.42 4.62 0.00 0.00 1.04
1993 7.98 3.46 3.42 0.00 0.00 0.59
1994 7.32 2.96 3.35 0.00 0.11 0.45
1995 5.74 2.44 2.28 0.00 0.25 0.07
1996 6.28 2.63 1.64 0.00 0.23 0.95
1997 6.55 3.36 1.51 0.00 0.43 0.75
1998 7.78 3.24 2.54 0.00 0.97 0.64
1999 6.34 2.51 1.99 0.00 0.80 0.68
2000 6.79 2.56 1.91 0.00 1.55 0.51
2001 10.10 4.13 2.61 0.18 2.42 0.57
2002 7.44 2.76 2.36 0.32 1.55 0.33
2003 6.88 2.99 1.65 0.37 1.52 0.24
2004 9.32 3.79 2.08 0.33 2.66 0.41
2005 9.77 2.68 1.48 0.32 4.37 0.84
2006 14.77 3.92 2.52 0.76 6.91 0.59
2007 19.38 3.14 3.67 1.50 10.66 0.39
32